Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of executions in both of those instances. While many states now bar executions of the retarded, other states continue to execute both retarded individuals and, on occasion, offenders who were under 18 at the time they committed the offenses for which they were executed.
11
As the above language indicates, the ABA Moratorium conflates the young and the retarded, both for purposes of analysis and as being treated similarly by the legislatures and courts. For analysis, the young and the retarded should not be treated the same, and generally are not for legal and governmental purposes such as rights to vote, to drink, to marry, and the like. In actual practice, as is discussed later in this article, the legislatures and courts have not treated these categories the same for purposes of the death penalty.
12
This article focuses solely upon the desirability of a moratorium on the death penalty for juvenile offenders, in particular those aged sixteen and seventeen at the time of their crimes (offenders younger than sixteen presently already are precluded). The national movement to ban the death penalty for juvenile offenders is much further along than that for retarded offenders, and, at this stage of development, they should be separated.
III LEGAL CONTEXT
Prior to twenty years ago, the death penalty for crimes by juvenile offenders was obscure in American law. Almost no statutes and only a few lower level cases had ever addressed the issue. Around 1980, slowly at first but now building momentum, our legal system began to take cognizance of the death penalty for juveniles.
A. United States Supreme Court Cases
Although the United States Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention to constitutional issues in death penalty cases generally, 13 the Court did not consider the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders until quite recently. The current era of the death penalty, from 1973 to 1998, was nearly half over before the Court finally took up the question. It was several more years before the Court addressed the issue squarely, and then it split as badly as possible in attempting even de minimis rulings. 14 11. Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 7, at 230-31. 12. For more of the author's views on these related but different topics, see Victor L. Streib, Executing Women, Children, and the Retarded: Second Class Citizens in Capital Punishment, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 201 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998) .
13. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 536 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) ; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) .
14. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (4-1-4 decision); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (4-1-3 decision).
An earlier opportunity arose in 1981, when the Court finally considered a certiorari petition putting forward the specific issue of the constitutionality of capital punishment for an offense committed when the defendant was only sixteen years old. 15 When the Court decided Eddings v. Oklahoma the next year, however, it sidestepped the direct constitutional issue but noted in passing that "the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight."
16
A four-Justice dissent would have reached the ultimate constitutional issue and would have rejected any constitutional bar to the execution of sixteen-year-olds. 17 After Eddings in 1982, the Court continued to appear to be tempted by the issue but for several years did not grant certiorari on the question. Burger v. Kemp 18 was decided in 1987, a case in which the offender was only seventeen years old at the time of his crime, but did not directly raise the age issue. In his dissent, 19 Justice Powell nonetheless questioned the constitutionality of the death penalty for the seventeen-year-old Burger and lamented the majority's unwillingness to wait for a decision squarely on that issue. 20 Even as Burger was being decided, the Court granted certiorari in Thompson v. Oklahoma, a case involving a fifteen-year-old offender, and decided that case one year later.
21
In Thompson, the issue was couched as "whether the execution of [a death] sentence would violate the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of 'cruel and unusual punishments' because petitioner was only 15 years old at the time of his offense." 22 The Court held that such an execution would be unconstitutional, but the ruling resulted from a four-Justice plurality to which Justice O'Connor added the crucial fifth vote on narrower grounds.
23
Justice Stevens's Thompson plurality opinion 24 began with a consideration of the obligatory Eighth Amendment benchmark-the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 25 Such "standards" require consideration of (1) current legislation on the acceptance or rejection of the death penalty for offenders younger than certain age limits, (2) jury willingness to impose death sentences on juveniles even where authorized, and (3) views of informed organizations and other nations on the acceptability of the juvenile death penalty. The Thompson plurality concluded that the Court is the ultimate arbiter of the limits of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
27
The Court measured the unique culpability of juveniles and the contribution of the juvenile death penalty to the acceptable social purposes of that penalty.
28
The plurality opinion concluded that juveniles generally have less culpability for their misdeeds and have a significant capacity for growth. 29 These unique characteristics, when blended with society's fiduciary obligations to its children, led the plurality to conclude that retribution "is simply inapplicable to the execution of a 15-year-old offender." 30 The other major criminological purpose of the death penalty-general deterrence of other similarly minded, homicidal juveniles-was also discounted by the plurality as inconsistent with what is known about the manner in which adolescents contemplate and evaluate the consequences of their behavior.
31
Since Wayne Thompson was only fifteen years old at the time of his crime, the plurality believed that it had no compelling need to address the argument in Thompson's brief that age eighteen was the most logical point at which to draw the line.
32 Whatever might be the zenith of this constitutional age limitation, the plurality held that the line was certainly no lower than age sixteen.
33
The crucial fifth vote to reverse Wayne Thompson's death penalty was added to the plurality's four votes by Justice O'Connor's solitary concurring opinion. 34 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor began with a survey of death penalty statutes and found that all statutory express minimum ages were sixteen or above. 35 While she went on to consider sentencing and execution statistics, as well as treaties and other information, 36 in the end Justice O'Connor returned to the legislative issue and found that states such as Oklahoma apparently had not given the minimum age issue the careful consideration it requires.
37 Until the states give the appropriate consideration to the issue, she would neither allow such states to execute offenders under age sixteen at the time of their crimes nor reach the broader question of the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. The fact that actual sentences and executions of such offenders had been rare indicated to the dissent simply a laudable community reluctance to impose such drastic measures, not a new constitutional standard. 41 Finally, the dissenters rejected the majority's principle that it is ultimately the Court's responsibility to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual instead of simply measuring the apparent societal standard.
42
Thompson had three dissenters. 43 50 and to these Justice Scalia added those states without any express minimum ages whatsoever on the premise that they meant to include juveniles of sixteen and seventeen.
51
The practice of sentencing and executing offenders aged sixteen and seventeen clearly had not been as rare as for fifteen-year-old offenders, and Justice Scalia's plurality in Stanford interpreted such rarity as understandable and laudable prudence rather than as a clear signal of an evolved standard of decency rejecting the practice.
52
The primary thrust of the Stanford plurality opinion essentially ended there. Justice Scalia already had rejected the practices of other nations as irrelevant to the American societal standard, 53 and next rejected the minimum ages of American statutes on noncapital punishment issues as irrelevant to the individualized analysis uniquely required in capital punishment cases. 54 Justice Scalia thought the Court should ignore the positions of various professional and learned societies, suggesting such views may be appropriate for legislative policy decisions but not for Supreme Court constitutional determinations. 55 His position therefore rejected the 1983 ABA Resolution, and presumably would similarly reject the ABA's 1997 Moratorium.
The Stanford plurality rejected the principle that the Court should refer to its own sense of Eighth Amendment requirements, dismissing proportionality analyses based upon relative moral culpability and measurable contributions to acceptable goals of punishment.
56
Finding no societal consensus against the death penalty for sixteen-and seventeen-year-old offenders, the opinion concluded that such punishment is not cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
57
Justice O'Connor's two-page concurrence in Stanford 58 began with a reminder that her Thompson concurrence required a specific, express minimum age in the pertinent death penalty statute before an eligible offender can be executed unless such execution is clearly not forbidden by a national consensus. 59 Justice O'Connor concluded, however, that the executions challenged in Stanford could proceed since "it is sufficiently clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition of capital punishment on sixteen-or seventeen-year-old capital murderers." 60 Justice Brennan's dissent in Stanford 61 tracked closely the analytical scheme of Justice Stevens's plurality opinion in Thompson. After finding the juvenile death penalty generally rejected by legislatures, juries, informed organizations, and other nations, 62 Justice Brennan noted the lesser moral culpability of juveniles and the failure of the juvenile death penalty to make any measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 63 The four Stanford dissenters would have drawn the minimum constitutional line at age eighteen.
64
Some rumblings of a challenge to Thompson have been heard from local prosecutors and trial court judges, but none have survived appellate court review. For example, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Thompson prevents fifteen-year-old offenders from being executed in Louisiana. 65 The same result was reached by the appellate courts in Indiana 66 and Alabama. 67 The Florida Supreme Court ruled that, regardless of any mandate from Thompson, the Florida Constitution's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment forbids the execution of fifteen-year-old offenders.
B. Current Statutes
Thirty-eight states and the federal government have statutes authorizing the death penalty for certain forms of murder. 69 Of those thirty-nine death penalty jurisdictions, fifteen (thirty-eight percent) have expressly chosen age eighteen at the time of the crime as the minimum age for eligibility for that ultimate punishment. Another four (ten percent) have chosen age seventeen as the minimum. The other twenty (fifty-one percent) use age sixteen as the minimum age, either through an express age in the statute (nine states) or by court ruling (eleven states). Table 1 lists the jurisdictions in the respective minimum age categories. 494 (Fla. 1994) Some legislative consideration of lowering the minimum age to sixteen can be detected, but it is minimal, at least at this time. For example, when the 1995 federal legislation to impose a wide array of harsher penalties and procedures on juvenile offenders was first proposed, it included a provision, in its original form, that reduced the federal death penalty minimum age limit from eighteen to sixteen. That provision was removed, however, and the federal age limit remains at eighteen.
IV INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW
Since at least the end of World War II, the juvenile death penalty has been prohibited by several international norms, such as the express provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and several other international treaties and agreements. 70 Despite such clear international norms, a few countries still follow this practice. Among these few, the United States appears to be the leader. Our country's continued use of the juvenile death penalty, therefore, not only puts us in direct conflict with the express provisions of the Convention but also makes us the strange odd-man-out in this practice.
Despite this unfavorable international climate for the juvenile death penalty, a few such executions continue to occur. Amnesty International has made the juvenile death penalty a key issue of concern, and its 1995 report on the juvenile death penalty 71 is the touchstone for this research. Amnesty International has documented executions of juvenile offenders in eight countries from 1985 through 1995, and it is reasonable to assume that other such executions occurred but have not been or cannot be documented. This research has focused primarily on executions of persons under age eighteen at the time of the execution, in contrast to the standard measure of age at the time of the crime. While it is true that the crime must have been committed while under age eighteen if the execution takes place while the offender is still under age eighteen, that approach inadvertently may exclude cases in which crimes were committed by persons under age eighteen even though they were over age eighteen when actually executed. As a result, the cases documented by Amnesty International must be seen as a bare minimum, and it should be assumed that other cases exist that have not been documented. While researchers on this topic are indebted to Amnesty International for having begun to document these executions, we still know very little about the offenders' crimes and the criminal processes by which they were convicted and sentenced to death. This is particularly problematic in comparing these foreign cases to those in the United States, about which we have detailed information as to all events and stages of the process. It must be concluded that the global extent of the use of the juvenile death penalty is still largely unknown. Whether the twenty-two cases documented by Amnesty International represent the vast majority of cases or only the tip of the iceberg cannot be said. However, one suspects that the United States nonetheless is a leader if Eleven of these executions for juvenile crimes have been imposed during the current era (January 1, 1973, to June 1, 1998). These eleven executions are only two percent of the total of 460 executions, about the same execution rate that had been experienced before 1973. Table 3 lists the eleven executions. extraordinary delay between sentencing and execution is also typical for adult cases, but earlier death penalty eras saw delays of only a very few years at most. All of the juvenile offenders executed during this current era were age seventeen at the time of their crimes. The last offender executed for a crime committed at age sixteen was Leonard M. Shockley, executed on April 10, 1959, in Maryland. 75 As is true in adult cases, Texas is by far the leader in execution of juvenile offenders, accounting for seven (sixty-four percent) of these eleven executions. Without Texas, the United States would have only minimal involvement in the death penalty for juvenile offenders.
VI JUVENILE DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE
CURRENT ERA Table 4 lists the sentences imposed each year according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics and to my research. A total of 172 juvenile death sentences have been imposed since 1973, only 2.7% of the total of almost 6,300 death sentences imposed for offenders of all ages. Over two-thirds of these juvenile death sentences have been imposed on seventeen-year-old offenders, the other third on offenders aged fifteen and sixteen, and none on offenders aged fourteen or younger at the time of their crimes. Of the 172 juvenile death sentences imposed in the current era, as illustrated in the "offenders" portion of Table 6 , only sixty-nine (forty percent) remain currently in force. Eleven (six percent) have resulted in execution, and ninety-two (fifty-three percent) have been reversed. Thus, for the 103 juvenile death sentences finally resolved (excluding the sixty-nine death row inmates remaining under juvenile death sentences but still litigating them), the reversal rate is eighty-nine percent (92/103). With only eleven executions resulting thus far from these 172 juvenile death sentences, this is an execution rate of 6.4% (11/172). Interestingly, the execution rate for all death sentences in this current era is 6.5%. 76 These 172 juvenile death sentences have been imposed in twenty-two individual states, comprising well over half of the death penalty jurisdictions during this time period. Texas and Florida are clear leaders in this practice, each having imposed many more juvenile death sentences than any other jurisdiction. Only five of the states have imposed ten or more such sentences. Juvenile death sentences for black and white juvenile offenders appear to be spread around the sentencing jurisdictions fairly evenly, but the nineteen Hispanic/Latino offenders are all in Texas, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. All eight Louisiana cases involved black offenders and all six Oklahoma cases involved white offenders.
Almost all juvenile offenders (ninety-eight percent) sentenced to death were males. The four cases involving female juveniles were in the deep south (Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia) and in Indiana. The thirteen very young offenders (age fifteen at crime) were scattered across ten different states. Appendix A (infra page 75) provides a more detailed listing of name, age, race, gender, state, and current status for each juvenile death sentence. 77 As included in Table 6 , as of June 1, 1998, sixty-nine persons were on death row under death sentences received for juvenile crimes. These sixty-nine condemned juvenile offenders constituted two percent of the total death row population of about 3,400. Although all were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of their crimes, in June 1998, their ages ranged from eighteen to thirtynine. They were under death sentences in twelve different states and had been on death row from one week to almost twenty years. Texas has by far the largest death row for juvenile offenders, holding twenty-five (thirty-six percent) of the national total of sixty-nine juvenile offenders.
All sixty-nine juvenile offenders on death row were male and had been convicted and sentenced to death for murder. Table 6 outlines the demographic characteristics of these sixty-nine juveniles and their ninety-one victims. More than three-quarters of these cases involved seventeen-year-old offenders, and two-thirds of them were minority offenders. In contrast, eightythree percent of the victims were adults. Two-thirds of the victims were white, and nearly half were females. The paradigm case of the juvenile offender on death row is that of the seventeen-year-old African-American or Latino male whose victim is a white adult. 77 . The primary and most reliable sources for these data concerning recent death sentences are the data-gathering efforts of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. (particularly their Death Row, U.S.A., which is published quarterly), the Death Penalty Information Center, and the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty. Gross sentencing data and patterns are also taken from the BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 76. The total number of persons under death sentences has increased by 181% in the past fifteen years, reflecting a steady rise from 1,209 in 1983 to about 3,400 on June 1, 1998. In contrast, the number of juvenile offenders under death sentences has risen much less quickly. Thirty-three juvenile offenders were under death sentences at the close of 1983, compared to sixty-nine juvenile offenders today (a 109% increase), but this number has fluctuated between these two extremes during this decade and a half. This comparatively constant death row population for juvenile offenders results from the fact that the number of new death sentences each year is roughly equal to the combination of death sentence reversals plus executions for juvenile offenders.
VII CONCLUSION: NEED FOR MORATORIUM
The general thrust of the Moratorium is to ask death penalty jurisdictions to correct several flaws and to afford greater fairness in the process. 79 However, 78. Appendix B, infra page 82, sets forth the names of the juvenile offenders currently on death row and some brief details about their crimes and sentences.
79. See American Bar Ass 'n, Report No. 107, at 15 (1997) , reprinted in Appendix, supra note 7, at 231. in the context of the juvenile death penalty process, even these changes would satisfy neither the Moratorium nor the 1983 ABA Resolution.
80
The Moratorium calls for the complete prevention of the execution of offenders under age eighteen at the time of their crimes.
81
As a result of the United States Supreme Court's intervention a decade ago, this practice is now limited to sixteen-and seventeen-year-old offenders, with offenders age fifteen and younger no longer being sentenced to death and executed in the United States. As the previous discussion 82 suggested, the Court came within one vote (an unfortunate timing of a retirement) of making this a moot issue in the United States. However, while the Court has decided by the narrowest of margins to permit states to continue with this practice if they wish to do so, it is clear that the Court does not clearly and strongly endorse the death penalty for juvenile offenders.
The international community is also on the side of opposing the death penalty for juveniles. 83 The continuing involvement of the United States in this practice aligns us with the criminal justice and human rights practices of such countries as Iran and Iraq, 84 odd company indeed for the leading democratic nation of the western world. If the United States wishes to continue to take the high road in pushing other nations to improve their human rights records, our leadership in the practice of the death penalty for juvenile offenders is a strong counterweight to our efforts.
To what alternatives might we turn? Can we, should we, rely on life imprisonment without parole as an acceptable alternative? Apparently, at least twenty-one states currently authorize the imposition of mandatory life imprisonment on fifteen-year-old offenders. 85 While still an evolving area of law, recent cases have permitted life sentences without parole for crimes committed at ages as young as thirteen. 86 However, if we shrink from sentencing a young teenager to death for his or her crimes, can we easily endorse sentencing young teenagers to prison for life without parole? Do not such young persons have every chance of changing as they grow older and mature, certainly as compared to the forty-year-old, three-time loser? Given their life expectancies of well over half a century, do we want to pay the cost to warehouse these young offenders into the second half of the next century? As Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1996) . 86. Instances of young teenagers sentenced to life imprisonment without parole include id.
(affirming the constitutionality of a 15-year-old offender in a robbery-murder being sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole); Washington v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988 ), review denied, 802 P.2d 126 (Wash. 1990 ), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1991 ) (13-year-old codefendant with Michael Harris in Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996 ); Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989) politically felicitous as it is to offer life without parole as an alternative to the death penalty, I for one cannot endorse condemning a young teenager to life in prison without hope of release. 87 An incarceration alternative of about twenty-five years followed by the possibility of parole would permit us to protect ourselves in the short term from presently violent teenagers. However, the long-term solution is not simply to continue to incarcerate and treat violent teenagers. We need to reduce the supply of violent teenagers in the first place. Our primary attention should be not on sixteen-year-old Johnny who rapes and kills people, but on Johnny's younger brothers who will grow up to be just like him. We not only have to take Johnny out of circulation for as long as necessary, but we have to work with our communities to change the lives of all of these children.
At present, we are reacting out of total frustration with teenage violence and turning to the most violent, draconian punishments for our children. The ABA Moratorium asks us to end this practice. The United States Supreme Court came within a fraction of an inch from abolishing it and the international community prohibits it. Even more powerful forces, such as basic decency and morality, raise the most serious concerns about a people that would kill their children in the name of justice. It is time for us to walk away from this practice, ashamed that we ever went there. 
